[Vol. 38 be based upon the reporter's own observations and calculations 2 or information imparted to the reporter from sources having no connection to any public agency whatsoever. 3 Rule 803(8)(C) has also been used as the vehicle for presenting juries with fact findings from hearings conducted by public officials. 4 The rule would seem to allow these fact findings even though the opponent had no opportunity to challenge either the finding or any of the witnesses whose testimony led to it. 5 This Article contends that admitting 770 KANSAS LAw REVIEW [Vol. 38 In Beech Aircraft Corporation v. Rainey, 8 the Supreme Court interpreted the "factual findings" provision of 803(8)(C) broadly to include "conclusions" and "opinions" of the investigator. 9 While the decision in Beech Aircraft is sensible in its recognition of the difficulty in distinguishing "factual findings" from "opinions" and "conclusions,"
10 it will result in an expansion of the type of hearsay-based evidence that will be admitted under Rule 803(8)(C).
11 Where a hearsay exception expands both the allowable sources of hearsay information and the type of hearsay-based evidence admitted, extreme care should be taken to ensure that questionably reliable or prejudicial evidence is not submitted to a jury without the opportunity to test the evidence through crossexamination. Rule 803(8)(C) was not drafted nor has it been generally applied with such caution.
First, this Article explores some of the problems encountered by courts in applying Rule 803(8)(C) and explains some of the unfairness that can result if it is not applied carefully. Second, it describes the Supreme Court's Beech Aircraft decision allowing opinions and conclusions into evidence under Rule 803(8)(C). Third, the Article describes a suggested reading of Rule 803(8)(C) in conjunction with the rules on expert witnesses that should help II. Taking the example of a police accident report, if the narrow view had been accepted, only specific findings of fact (for example, the speed of the automobiles and the point of impact) could have been admitted. Under the broad approach adopted by the Court, the investigator's conclusions regarding who was at fault in the accident might also be admitted. Not only will more findings be admissible under this standard, but because the investigator's conclusions often approach the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury, their admission will have a greater impact on the jury and a greater possibility of prejudice. courts determine which opinions and conclusions should be admissible. Finally, the Article offers additional suggestions to insure the fair application of Rule 803(8)(C).
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH RULE 803(8)(C)
Rule 803(8)(C) has the capacity to expand significantly the amount and manner of hearsay and hearsay-based conclusions made available to juries in civil cases. Under Rule 803(8)(C), reports or records of public officials are admissible without the presence of the reporting officer, even though the reports contain hearsay and conclusions based upon hearsay.
A. Lack of Cross-Examination
The first danger posed by Rule 803(8)(C) is the use of a fact finding in a public report without an opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine the reporter to determine the basis for the finding. One justification for the use of such fact findings is that public officials are objective and sufficiently responsible to include fact findings in their reports only if based on reliable information. 12 In our adversary system, however, this assertion should be tested. For example, it is reasonable to expect that jurors could more effectively assess the reliability of a fact finding if they knew the background, training, and experience of the fact finder . 13 Such information is unlikely to appear in a public report and would certainly not be revealed to the extent that it could be through cross-examination. Juries are likely to benefit even more from knowing specifically how the public reporter arrived at the finding.
12. Justification for the exception i~ the assumption that a public official will perform his duty properly and the unlikelihood that he will remember details independently of the record. FED. R. Evm. 803(8) advisory committee's note.
The principal basis for the presumption of trustworthiness of public records is the assumption that public officials will properly perform their duties with accuracy and fidelity. Officials have the duty to make accurate statements, and this special duty will usually suffice as a motive to incite the officer to its fulfillment.
Grant, supra note 10, at 56 (footnotes omitted); see also supra note 6.
13. Courts have recognized the importance of having the jury hear the qualifications, including background and training, of expert witnesses. Murphy v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. 547 F.2d 816, 817 (4th Cir. 1977) ("Moreover, a jury can better assess the weight to be accorded an expert's opinion if the witness is permitted to explain his qualifications.") (citation omitted); see also Scharfenberger v. Wingo, 542 F.2d 328, 337 (6th Cir. 1976) (cross-examination concerning expert's qualifications is appropriate). There is no reason to believe that there is any less need for the jury to have information about the qualifications of the author of an opinion expressed in an investigative report than of an expert at trial.
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Even if such an explanation appears in the report, without crossexamination the opponent would have little or no opportunity to demonstrate weaknesses in the fact finder's methodology or to suggest better procedures that could have been employed. 14 An even greater problem arises when reports are admitted containing conclusions based in whole or in part upon the observation or information of third parties. Such information may not possess any guarantees of trustworthiness that customarily underlie the hearsay exceptions, yet still form the basis for a fact finding admitted under Rule 803(8)(C). 15 In fact, Rule 803(8)(C) has been 14. The jury in such a situation would be deprived of several pieces of important information that could have been uncovered during cross-examination of the public fact finder. The witness's attention, for example, might have been drawn to material facts in the case not utilized by the fact finder in reaching his conclusion, and during crossexamination the fact finder could be asked whether his conclusion would be modified by those additional facts. R. GrvENS, ADVOCACY: THE ART OF PLEADING A CAUSE 39 (1985); T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 226 (2d ed. 1988). If the fact finder used certain techniques of investigation, the cross-examiner can point to other techniques that might have been equally or more effective. See T. MAUET, SUPRA, at 267.
If the fact finder relied upon her expertise in a certain area, cross-examination may reveal that this area has not yet developed into an area of expertise commonly accepted by courts or others in the field. SeeM. BERGER, J. MITCHELL & R. CLARK, TRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY 421 (1989) (hereinafter BERGER). Cross-examination may also reveal that her conclusion is not beyond challenge, and therefore others in the field may arrive at different conclusions using the same data. See BERGER, supra at 422; R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 157 (2d ed. 1973). Further, the expert fact finder can be confronted on cross-examination with learned treatises that may reveal opinions contradictory to those of the witness. See R. KEETON, supra at 158; J. Jeans, Trial Advocacy 335 (1975); see also FED. R. Evm. 803(18).
15. Most of the hearsay exceptions involve situations in which the firsthand observer is also the declarant, and the exception is based on the reliability of the observer-declarant. For example, the excited utterance exception, Rule 803(2), is based on the assumption that "a condition of excitement ... temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication." FED. R. Evm. 803(2) advisory committee's note. The observer's statement about what he has witnessed is deemed reliable by the circumstances. Under Rule 803(8)(C), where the investigator has based her report on the statement of firsthand observers, nothing inherent in the situation guarantees the reliability or truthfulness of the original observer. The only other exception that allows admission of information obtained from the statement of others is Rule 803(6), the business records exception, which allows admission of records made "by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge .... " FED. R. Evm. 803(6). This has been interpreted, however, to require not only the declarant, but also the supplier of the information to be acting in the regular course of business and therefore acting with a duty of accuracy. "If, however, the supplier of the information does not act in the regular course, an essential link is broken; the assurance of accuracy does not extend to the information itself, and the fact that it may be recorded with scrupulous accuracy is of no avail." FED. R. Evm. 803(6) advisory committee's note. See 16 for example, the trial court used Rule 803(8)(C) to admit the findings of an administrative law judge ("ALJ") following a license revocation hearing regarding the reasonableness of a ship captain's actions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed that the judge's findings appeared to be based largely on hearsay and unreliable testimony, yet the court approved of their admission because the opponent could not demonstrate explicitly the extent to which the ALJ relied upon the untrustworthy testimony .
17
In Paducah, therefore, the findings were admitted without an opportunity to examine the witness or the fact finder to determine either the basis for the decision or to what extent the fact finder relied upon the "unreliable" witness. Hearsay proscriptions and first-hand knowledge requirements were created to avoid such scenarios.
18
Rule 803(8)(C) permits the use of such a fact finding without the presence of either the public reporter-fact finder or the thirdparty informant. The opponent of the fact finding loses the opportunity to cross-examine both of these important witnesses. The jury, therefore, is likely to learn either directly or indirectly the observations of a third-party informant not examined for credibility or accuracy.
B. Fact Findings Based upon Third-Party Informants
Hearsay documents that contain additional hearsay are subject to the general rule that even though the document itself may constitute an exception to the hearsay rule (for example, a business record), hearsay statements within the document are inadmissible unless covered by their own exception.
19 Rule 803(6) does allow such double hearsay in business records, but only if the informant and the reporter are acting in the regular course of business.
20 If the informant is not within the business chain of information, the [Vol. 38 reliability of the hearsay contained in the record is substantially diminished, and the basis for the exception eroded.
21
By contrast, Rule 803(8)(C), as interpreted by some courts, places no restriction on the source of the information in a public record, provided that there is no demonstrable lack of trustworthiness in the source. 22 The source of the information and the hearsay statement itself are presumed reliable because the public official has deemed the information sufficiently trustworthy to have based a factual finding upon it and it has been included in the public record. 23 In essence, the statute delegates the responsibility for deciding the admissibility of such hearsay and hearsay-based conclusions to the government reporter, with the court retaining 23. See supra note 6. 24. The government reporter is deemed to be fair and to prepare accurate reports based on reliable information. See supra note 6. Because the burden of proof is on the opponent to show indicia of a lack of trustworthiness, an absence of information on the trustworthiness of the report or its sources is customarily no bar to admissibility under Rule 803(8)(C). Additionally, because a government reporter need not appear before the court to explain why his report and its sources are trustworthy, the court is, in effect, deferring to the judgment of the reporter. The combined effect of the burden of proof and the inclination to defer to the judgment of the government fact finder may lead to the admission of highly questionable evidence under Rule 803(8)(C).
In Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412, the finding of an ALJ regarding the reasonableness of a ship captain's actions was admitted at trial under Rule 803(8)(C), despite the court's finding that the key source was unreliable. Although it could not be determined precisely to what extent the finding was based on this source, " [t] , the court admitted into evidence a study undertaken by the Center for Disease Control ("CDC") regarding toxic shock syndrome, discounting allegations that the study was "hasty" and "methodologically flawed." The court admitted the study because the expertise of those conducting it was "assumed," and the above noted flaws, according to the court, went to the weight rather than the admissibility of the report. Wolf, 555 F. Supp. at 625; see also Walker v. Fairchild Indus., 554 F. Supp. 650, 654-55 (D. Nev. 1982) (finding of aircraft investigation based in part upon tests done by investigator who admitted there was no The conclusions of expert witnesses, like those of Rule 803(8)(C) public reporters, are generally admissible, although these conclusions may be based to some degree on what was learned from others. 25 Such witnesses, however, must be established as experts on the witness stand, and the use of third-party information must be of a type customarily used by experts in the field before their hearsay-based conclusions are admissible. 26 While the advisory committee note to Rule 803(8) includes the skill and experience of the public fact finder as one element used to assess the trustworthiness of a report, neither expertise nor customary usage is a sine qua non for admissibility, as it is for live expert testimony. 27 This Article argues that they should be.
More fundamental distinctions between the admission of the hearsay-based conclusion of an expert witness and one that appears in a public report admitted under Rule 803(8)(C) can be seen through consideration of the cross-examination of such a witness. In addition to challenging the expertise of the witness and the methodology used, the expert witness can be cross-examined regarding the reasons for relying upon third-party information and the guarantees of the informant's credibility and accuracy. 28 These reports often contain fact findings that are vital to the outcome of a lawsuit, such as which vehicle had the right-of-way or whether a pedestrian was walking in the crosswalk. 30 Should juries be allowed to consider these conclusions without the opponent having had the opportunity to challenge either the officer or the eyewitness on this crucial, often subjective piece of testimony? If so, certainly there should be either strong guarantees of their trustworthiness or a compelling need to dispense with our system's time-tested method of determining accuracy and truthfulnesscross-examination. 31 As often applied, Rule 803(8)(C) contains neither of these. examination or to forego use of the evidence. Id. at 1115. The court refused to hold, however, that all official reports were inadmissible merely because there was no opportunity to cross-examine the author of the report, beo;ause this would "drain the vitality of Rule 803(8)." /d.
One technique for probing the expert's opinion is for the cross-examiner to pose his own hypothetical question to the expert using facts different or in addition to those used in forming the opinion in the report. See, e.g., J. JEANS, supra note 14, at 334; R. KEETON, supra note 14, at 163-64.
It is noteworthy that an expert may testify under Rule 703 to conclusions based on information that would not otherwise be admissible. The possible unreliability of that information may not be discovered without cross-examination. J. McELHANEY, Mc-ELHANEY's TRIAL NOTEBOOK 369 (2d ed. 1987). Although Rule 803(8)(C) has the "escape clause" requirement of trustworthiness, it is often impossible for the opponent to know whether untrustworthy information was relied upon before the report is offered into evidence. Comment, supra note 10, at 167. Given that the burden of proving the untrustworthiness of the report under Rule 803(8)(C) is on the opponent, see supra note 22, the statute places the opponent in a particularly difficult position by depriving him of the opportunity to cross-examine the expert regarding the basis of his opinion. 
C. Fact Findings Resulting from Hearings
The admission of public officials' fact findings from a hearing present special problems under the rule. The admission of such findings may be significantly more prejudicial than those in a public official's own report, yet less probative of the issues to be determined at trial.
The report of a public official who conducts an on-the-scene investigation and makes a subsequent fact finding based largely on personal knowledge may be an important piece of evidence because it is contemporaneous with the event, its inclusion of empirical observations, and especially because of its inability to be replicated at trial. 32 The fact finding reached after a hearing adds nothing to the jury's deliberation, other than the conclusion of another fact finder arrived at through a process similar to the one that the trial jury is undergoing. 33 This similarity in the process, basing a conclusion upon the testimony of witnesses, not only makes the determination by the hearing officer superfluous, but also creates undue prejudice for the opponent of the fact finding. 33. None of the reasons advanced by McCormick for allowing admission of investigative reports, see supra note 32, apply when the fact finding is not the result of a timely, on-the-scene investigation, but rather made pursuant to a testimonial hearing. The hearing will likely involve the same witnesses testifying about the same matters as the present trial. Nothing important is added by knowing the hearing officer's reaction to the same evidence now being presented to the jury.
In Lloyd v. American Export Lines, 34 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found error in a trial court's exclusion of the "professional hearing examiner's" findings following a hearing concerning a shipboard fight. 35 The court held that the jury should be permitted to learn the hearing examiner's conclusion that there was insufficient credible evidence to determine that Lloyd was the aggressor, 36 a crucial issue in Lloyd's lawsuit against the ship company for negligence. The court's explanation for admission was that ''the hearing examiner did no more than summarize the evidence and point out inconsistencies. "
37 Such a finding necessarily involves a determination of credibility, and as such should be left to the jury alone to make the independent assessment that our system requires. 38 Even if the court's description of the conclusions was correct, however, there is little benefit and real danger in the jury's receiving a summary of witnesses' statements.
39
Jurors learning that a presumably objective public official has reached a certain conclusion after hearing evidence similar to what they have heard may have difficulty reaching an opposite conclusion. 40 Further, the jury is likely to deliberate on the correctness of the previous fact finding, rather than retaining the open-minded, the report may unduly prejudice the jury whose responsibility is to make a de novo determination of plaintiffs' claims and its conclusions are based in part on credibility determinations concerning the witnesses appearing at the hearing which undermine the exclusive province of the jury. /d. at 591. first impression approach to the issues our system prefers. 41 The emphasis likely to be placed on this fact finding by the jury is especially unfair where the opponent of the fact finding has had little or no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who testified at the hearing.
In Perrin v. Anderson, 42 for example, Rule 803(8)(C) was used to admit the conclusion of a police department shooting review board that the defendant police officers acted in accord with department policy during a shooting incident. The board, composed entirely of police personnel, held nonadversarial hearings that consisted solely of questioning the defendants and their superiors. 43 Although the trial judge gave a limiting instruction regarding the finding, certainly the truth-finding process would have been better served by the jury's drawing its own conclusion regarding the propriety of the officer's actions after hearing the testimony of all of the witnesses and seeing them challenged through cross-examination. Then, if it is determined that it would be helpful to the jury to present expert testimony as to the propriety of the officer's actions, that expert should be called and crossexamined in the presence of the jury. 44 When (as in Perrin) Rule 803(8)(C) is used to present to a jury a police board's fact finding based solely on police witnesses testifying without cross-examination, real prejudice will be done to the opponent of the fact finding.
D. Insufficiency of Trustworthiness Factors
The language of Rule 803(8)(C)-especially as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Beech Aircraft-is broad enough to encompass a variety of reports, fact findings, and conclusions from different 41. In MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 230, the court stated that "admission [of a preliminary army finding following a hearing] would have tended to perplex, in that it likely would have distracted the jury's attention from its task of ascertaining guilt or innocence to a second-guessing of the Government's conduct of the murder investigation. [Vol. 38 types of public officials. 45 The procedure used by the public fact finder and the manner in which the finding is used vary, among other things, according to the nature of the official's job and the specific prerequisites sometimes mandated for using the finding. 46 Different types of fact findings reached in different manners by investigators with different credentials deserve different treatment regarding their admissibility at trial. This is especially true, both because such variations can result in differences in reliability, and because under Rule 803(8)(C) the admission of certain types of government fact findings without cross-examination of either the fact finder or the informant can be extremely prejudicialY Social workers, for example, who visit a family's home to investigate a report of suspected child abuse may determine whether abuse has taken place based upon personal observations and from the statements of the child and neighbors. 48 Consumer Product Safety Commission officials who are investigating the danger of a new toy may base their reports on statistical studies and tests performed on the toy. 49 The panel established in many states to examine medical malpractice claims makes its findings in part on the sworn testimony of witnesses in a quasitrial that includes cross-examination. 50 There may not be crossexamination at the coroner's inquest, but sworn testimony will lead to a "verdict," including a conclusion as to the cause of deathY Each of these factual findings result "from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law" and should be admissible in civil trials under Rule 803(8)(C), absent a showing of untrustworthiness.
52 Each finding, however, has been reached by a different procedure that contains greater or lesser assurances of trustworthiness, and therefore different risks of prejudice if admitted at trial. Thus, it is important that the admission of such findings at trial without cross-examination of the fact finder or the informant should occur only after carefully assessing the trustworthiness of the fact finders, their sources, and the process employed to reach the fact finding. Unfortunately, the factors provided by the advisory committee for Rule 803(8) for determining trustworthiness, as interpreted by many courts, are insufficient; moreover, they fail to recognize the differences discussed above. 53 Further, no government fact finding should be admitted at trial without examination of the possible prejudice resulting from submitting such a fact finding to the jury through cross-examination of the fact finders or their sources. 54 The only limitation found in Rule 803(8)(C) on the admission of fact findings within public reports which meet the general criteria of Rule 803(8), is that the report must not be untrustworthy. 55 It is most important, therefore, to determine whether the following trustworthiness factors found in the advisory committee note to the rule provide realistic assurances of reliability for fact findings based upon hearsay sources: (1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the special skill or experience of the official; (3) [Vol. 38 hearing was held and the level at which conducted; and (4) possible motivation problems suggested by Palmer v. Hojjman. 56 Each of these factors may be useful in determining the trustworthiness of certain public reports. In evaluating other public reports, however, even reliance upon all of the factors can be unhelpful and may result in the admission of hearsay-based fact findings without adequate assurances of reliability. Perhaps the following example will demonstrate this. One common public report likely to contain fact findings based at least in part upon third-party statements is the standard police report compiled after an automobile accident. Assume an officer responds immediately to the scene of an accident and compiles a report expeditiously. Further assume that the officer is an experienced and able accident investigator, perhaps qualifying as an "expert accidentologist" in those jurisdictions that recognize such an expertise. 57 Many courts apparently find it irrelevant when evaluating reports where no hearing is customarily held, that no hearing is held prior to the officer's fact findings. 58 Thus, three of the advisory committee's factors have been removed as obstacles· to the trustworthiness of the report, and the final criteria may be explored-"motivation problems suggested by Palmer v. Hojjman."59 Palmer, 60 a railroad accident case, discussed the admissibility of a report prepared by the defendant railroad company that included a statement by the main engineer as to the cause of the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge that the report could not qualify as a business record under a predecessor statute to Rule 803(6). 61 The report prepared by the railroad company regarding an accident caused by one of its trains "may have some relationship" to its business, it is not within the regular course of its business to prepare such reports. 62 Thus, fundamentally, the use of such a self-serving report, prepared in part for litigation, would ignore the nonobjective character of the records and would result in questionable reliability because of "their source and origin and the nature of their compilation. " 63 Therefore, if the officer in our automobile accident bases the fact finding upon a statement of a witness who happens to be the spouse of the defendant driver, the lack of objectivity of such a source might result in the exclusion of the report. 64 Nonetheless, in at least one frequently cited Rule 803(8)(C) case, Baker v. Elcona Homes, 65 the court admitted a police accident report containing a fact finding based in part on the self-serving statement of a truck driver who worked for the defendant. 66 The court achieved this result by interpreting the advisory committee's caution concerning motivation problems as applying only to the preparer of the report and not to the source of the information.
67 This approach ignores both the thrust of the Supreme Court's opinion in Palme~8 and the actual language of Rule 803 (8) 6~9 F.2d 721 (court disallowed a similar police accident report because it was based in part on the story of a "biased eyewitness"). The court stated, "[t]he trial process is better served when a biased eyewitness declarant is required to testify directly and to be subject to cross-examination. To permit his opinion to be heard through the testimony of an official. would cloak it with undeserved authority that could unduly sway a jury." /d. at 722.
68. See infra note 158. 69. The Baker court quoted the statute denying admissibility when the "sources of the information or the circumstances" Jack trustworthiness. Baker, 588 F.2d at 558 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note). When applying the advisory committee's factors of trustworthiness to the facts of the present case with respect to motivation, however, the court noted only that "there is no indication that the report was made with improper motive. Sgt. Hendrickson was completely independent of both parties" and impartial. /d. Thus, the court never considered the motivation of one important and likely biased source of information, the driver. See also Anaya v. New Mexico State Personnel [Vol. 38 the rationale for Rule 803(8)(C), apparently relied upon by the Baker court, is that public officials will consider the possible bias of the source before using it in arriving at their fact finding because of their objectivity and appreciation of the need for accuracy in public documents. 70 Thus, there is some support for admitting a police report under Rule 803(8)(C), even where the fact finding is based in part on the hearsay statement of a biased source, as long as the officer's objectivity is clear.
If the eyewitness to the accident upon whom the officer bases the fact finding has no relationship to either of ~he parties, there would seem to be no motivation problem, and thus no barrier to the admission of the report. Although the admission of such a document could be construed as a faithful application of Rule 803(8)(C), such a ruling would constitute an unwarranted and perhaps dangerous expansion of the existing hearsay exceptions for several reasons.
First, if the officer were to testify orally to the hearsay-based conclusion, it would be admissible only if the officer were recognized as an expert by the court and if the officer relied upon the type of information customarily relied upon by experts in the field. Unlike the ambiguity of the Rule 803(8)(C) factors, both of these are clear prerequisites to receiving the officer's conclusion under Rules 702 and 703, and they could be tested by cross-examination.
71
Including the findings in a report should not constitute a license for overcoming hearsay and first-hand knowledge proscriptions.
72
Second, when hearsay-based fact findings in a police report are admitted, the officer becomes the real judge of the credibility and accuracy of the eyewitness. Without the opportunity to hear crossexamination of either the officer or the eyewitness, the jury would be deprived of the ability to assess the accuracy of the eyewitness's account or even to hear why the officer regarded the witness as reliable enough to base opinions upon. The judge also would not be able to make a meaningful determination of the trustworthiness of the report as required by Rule 803(8)(C). 73 Additionally, in civil cases, a police report carries the imprimatur of government objecBd., 107 N.M. 622, 628, 762 P.2d 909, 914 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), in which a report concerning the causes of a prison escape was admitted against a corrections officer under a state statute identical to Rule 803(8)(C), although the sources of the information for the report were accomplices to the escapee and other inmates. In response to the officer's claim that these sources were untrustworthy, the court stated, "it is the trustworthiness of the report that is relevant. the inconvenience of requiring public officials to . . . testify concerning the subject matter of their records and reports. Not only would this disrupt the administration of public affairs, but it almost certainly would create a class of official witnesses. Moreover, given the volume of business in public offices, the official written statement will usually be more reliable than the official's present memory. McCoRMICK, supra note l, at 889 (footnotes omitted).
Although such rationales may apply to certain types of government documents when the public official's connection to the document is largely ministerial, these justifications are largely misplaced when applied to police accident reports. Police officers are so frequently called upon as witnesses in a variety of proceedings that testifying in court is a regular part of their job. Additionally, while the preparer is likely to forget certain information in a public document, an officer's fact findings (for example, his determination of the cause of an accident) is more likely to be remembered, especially after having his recollection refreshed by the document.
In any event, when a document contains the subjective opinion of a public official regarding perhaps the crucial issue, such as who caused the accident, should the inconvenience to the public official justify receipt of his opinion without cross-examination?
74. See infra note 188. [Vol. 38 evidentiary rulings in the federal courts. 76 Rule 803(8)(C) invites disparate treatment of the admissibility of public reports and fact findings through its broad language, its multifactored approach, and its controversial expansion of the amount and type of hearsay admitted at trial. Not surprisingly, the federal courts have differed widely in their approach to hearsay-based public fact findings admitted under Rule 803(8)(C) 78 While such an approach would avoid many of the problems addressed above, it seems to conflict with one of the purposes of Rule 803(8)(C).
79
Other courts and commentators seem to suggest that Rule 803(8)(C) admits all public reports unless the opponent can demonstrate untrustworthiness. 80 The courts presume reliability in the One way in which courts minimize the limiting effect on admissibility of the advisory committee's factors is to claim that problems respecting the factors go to the weight and not the admissibility of the document. Wolf, 555 F. Supp. at 625 (study described as "hasty" and "methodologically flawed"); Walker, 554 F. Supp. 650, 654-55 (investigator who performed tests had no expertise in that area and no scientific bases for the tests); Sage, 477 F. Supp. at 1209 (inexperience of investigator For example, some courts have discounted the factor dealing with whether a hearing was held, often reasoning that certain types of fact findings are generally arrived at without hearings. 85 When a hearing has been held, some courts weigh heavily whether crossexamination occurred at the hearing, 86 while others seem satisfied merely that there was no overt bias displayed by the hearing examiner.
87
The disparate treatment accorded to the factor involving the special skill of the investigator is even more pronounced. Some courts graft Article VII of the Federal Rules onto Rule 803(8)(C) and weigh heavily whether the fact finding was performed by an expert prior to its admission. 88 Others view the skill and experience of the investigator as bearing primarily on the weight to be given the report, rather than its admissibility. 89 In one recent case, Diaz v. United States, 90 the report of a Judge Advocate General ("JAG") officer containing "summaries" of his interviews with witnesses to an accident was admitted even though the officer "did not have any particular legal or investigative skills," because "the scope of the informal investigation was sufficiently narrow so that special skill or experience was not essential. "
91 Such a cursory dismissal of the skill factor by the court raises several questions. Is such lack of credentials to be ( overcome by the "informal" nature of the investigation? If so, how does this impact on the factor that suggests that the holding of a hearing should raise the likelihood of admission? More fundamentally, what benefit exists to submitting the report of a nonexpert fact finder that is nothing more than a collection of third party statements, merely because the fact finder or reporter is a public official? Surely whatever benefit is achieved by admission of such a document is outweighed by the inability of the opponent to cross-examine the unchallenged versions of the witnesses that have been summarized by the government reporter. 92 Clearly, if the reporter had been a witness, the reporter would not have been permitted to give summaries of the witnesses' statements.93
The last advisory committee factor concerns motivation problems. As discussed earlier, some courts have ignored the apparent bias of the source of the information because of the objectivity of the public investigator, who presumably takes the source's bias into consideration. 94 In Diaz, the court reasoned that although the JAG officer was a representative of a party litigant, the report was unbiased because it was prepared primarily for nonlitigation purposes. 95 In addition to the enumerated factors, the advisory committee invited courts to develop other factors for evaluating trustworthiness. In Zenith Radio Corp. v 102 At trial, the defendants attempted to introduce portions of a report prepared 7) If the finding includes the opinion of an expert, is it based upon the type of information customarily used by experts in the field? The Third Circuit, partially affirming and partially reversing Judge Becker's decision, stated: "The trial court gave undue weight to considerations either legally irrelevant under Rule 803(8)(C) or of only slight relevance, and too little weight to the fact that the investigation was conducted by officials charged with a legal duty to conduct it, for an important governmental purpose." In re Japanese Elec. Prods Antitrust Litig., 723 F. The reasoning of the appellate court in Zenith Radio diminishes the protections against admitting hearsay that may be both unreliable and prejudicial. The justification offered for obviating the need for these protections is that the fact fittding involved was conducted by public officials in a proper manner for important reasons. Such a justification in essence delegates to the public officials the determination of trustworthiness required by Rule 803(8)(C) prior to the admission of a fact finding in a public record. by a Navy investigator pursuant to authority granted in the Manual of the Judge Advocate General. This JAG Report, written after a six-week investigation, attempted to fix the cause of the crash and contained "findings of fact," "opinions," and "recommendations." 103 The trial judge found the report sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under Rule 803(8)(C), but originally held that it '' 'would be admissible only on its factual findings and would not be admissible insofar as any opinions or conclusions are concerned.' " 104 The day before trial the court reversed itself and held that most of the conclusions and opinions, including those as to the cause of the crash, could be admitted. 105 After a jury verdict for the defendants, the plaintiffs appealed. An Eleventh Circuit panel reversed on the basis of a Fifth Circuit precedent that held that Rule 803(8)(C) did not encompass evaluative conclusions or opinions. 106 This decision was upheld after rehearing en bane by an equally divided court. 107 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to ''address a longstanding conflict among the federal courts of appeal over whether Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), which provides an exception to the hearsay rule for public investigatory reports containing 'factual findings,' extends to conclusions and opinions contained in such reports."
108
The Court first turned to the statutory language and refused to read the term "factual findings" as meaning only "facts. [Vol. 38 determined that "finding of fact" was a broader term, often meaning " '[a] conclusion by way of reasonable inference from the evidence.' " 109 Further, the Court noted that the rule does not allow for the admission of only "factual findings" in a report, but rather for the admission of " 'reports ... setting forth ... factual findings.' " 1 10
The Court next turned to the legislative history, but found no clear answer because House and Senate committees took "diametrically opposite positions" on this issue, and Congress made no effort to reconcile their differences.
111 The Court found the broader Senate view allowing admission of conclusions and opinions more in accord not only with the language of the rule, but also with the comments of the advisory committee. The Court noted that the advisory committee made no mention of any distinction between statements of fact and opinions and conclusions. Furthermore, the committee's examples of when reports had been admitted either by the courts or by federal statute were all reports that stated conclusions.
112 The Court found that the committee intended the trustworthiness requirement to be the major safeguard of the rule and not "an arbitrary distinction" between fact and opinion.
113
The Court also noted the difficulty in trying to distinguish between fact and opinion, citing a number of commentators who have found this a false distinction which is "at best, one of degree. '' 114 Finally, the Court found the broad approach consistent with the federal rules' general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony.
115
The Court found, therefore, "that portions of investigatory reports otherwise admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) are not inadmissible merely because they state a· conclusion or opinion. ' 
A. General Guideline
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) allows admission of factual findings in a government report resulting from an investigation made pursuant to law. The Supreme Court, in Beech Aircraft, has given a broad interpretation to "factual findings" to include "conclusions and opinions" of the investigator. 119 It is important to recognize, however, that merely because such a conclusion or opinion fits within the parameters of Rule 803(8)(C), it is not automatically admissible into evidence. Rather, it is merely "not excluded by the hearsay rule." 120 The opinion or conclusion may still be inadmissible for other reasons, such as lack of personal knowledge of the declarant, 121 as an improper opinion, 122 or because its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
123
The purpose of Rule 803(8)(C), like all hearsay exceptions, is to allow admission of an out-of-court statement by declarant, rather than requiring that the statement be given live in court. No hearsay exception, including Rule 803(8)(C), should be extended to allow admission of an out-of-court statement that would not be admissible if the declarant were to make the same statement in court under oath. Therefore, Rule 803(8)(C) should be interpreted in 117 [Vol. 38 such a manner that "factual findings" contained in an investigative report should not be admissible unless the author of that report would have been permitted to testify as to those findings if present in court.
B. Findings Based on Hearsay: Experts Versus Nonexperts
A problem manifests itself when the investigator's findings are based, not only on his personal observations, but also on the hearsay statements of others. Because Rule 803 lists. exceptions to the rule against hearsay and is not a rule of admissibility, such a finding would, at first blush, not appear admissible because it is not based on the declarant's personal knowledge. The advisory committee's notes to Rule 803 state that "In a hearsay situation, the declarant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rule nor Rule 804 dispenses with the requirement of firsthand knowledge. "124 Rule 803, however, clearly envisions the admissibility of at least some findings not based on personal knowledge under section C. Otherwise, section C would be largely superfluous, because section B already applies to any "matters observed pursuant to duty" and would therefore apply in most situations where the investigator's findings were based on personal knowledge.
125
The most reasonable way to solve this apparent paradox is to read Rule 803(8)(C) in conjunction with the rules for expert witnesses. 126 To determine whether an investigator's findings would be admissible if the investigator were testifying in person, it must first be determined whether the investigator would qualify as an expert at trial.
Pursuant to Rule 602, a nonexpert witness may only testify as to facts which he has personally observed.
127 Therefore, if the investigators of the report would not qualify as expert witnesses, they would not be allowed to testify in person to facts that they had learned through hearsay sources. Their written report, if based on hearsay, should also not be admitted. 124 . FED. R. Evm. 803 advisory committee's note. 125. Section 803(8)(8) "matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel .... " FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(8).
126. FED. R. Evm. 701-06. 127. FED. R. Evm. 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter .... This rule is subject to the provisions of rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.").
In contrast, expert witnesses may base their testimony on facts or data made known to them before the hearing, and as long as they are of the type normally relied on by experts in the field, they need not be admissible.
128 Therefore, if the investigators could be considered experts, then the factual findings in their reports would be admissible even if based on hearsay, as long as it was the kind of hearsay on which experts in their field would normally rely.tz9
To apply this distinction, consider again the example of a police officer who, based on interviews with witnesses at the scene of an accident, determines that the light was red for one driver and green for another. If testifying in person at trial, the officer could not give that evidence unless held to be an expert witness. This same standard should be held with regard to the admissibility of the report, which should not be given any greater credence than the officer's live testimony.
C. Opinions of a Nonexpert
An additional problem arises if the investigative report contains the conclusions and opinions of the investigator. Although the Supreme Court held in Beech Aircraft that factual findings admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) included opinions and conclusions, it again failed to draw the necessary distinction between the opinions of an expert and nonexpert investigator.
The opinions of expert witnesses are generally admissible. 130 The opinions of nonexperts, although more freely admitted under the federal rules than under the common law, are still more limited than the opinions of experts. 131 In addition, to meet the requirement of first-hand knowledge, the opinion or inference must be "helpful to a clear understanding of [the witness's] testimony or the deter-
Rule 703 reads:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. FED. R. Evm. 703. Allowing experts to testify based on data not presented in court and not perceived by the expert personally constituted a broadening of the common-law rule. FED. R. Evm. 703 advisory committee's note.
129. See infra notes 151-62 and accompanying text. 130. FED. R. Evm. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
131. See McCORMICK, supra note I, at 26-29.
[Vol. 38 mination of a fact in issue." 132 For example, a lay witness could testify that a person appeared drunk, 133 but probably could not give an opinion that the defendant was at fault in the accident. 134 An expert, on the other hand, might be able to give such an opinion.
135
In Beech Aircraft, before holding that the investigator's conclusion that the accident was probably the result of pilot error was admissible under Rule 803(8)(C), the Supreme Court should have determined whether he would have been qualified as an expert witness to provide such an opinion. The Court did discuss the expertise of the investigator, as one of the advisory committee's "factors" in determining the admissibility of a report under Rule 803(8)(C) is the "special skill or experience of the official." 136 Rather than merely a "factor" to be considered, however, the expertise of the officials should be a sine qua non of admitting the written opinion in their report. 137 Obviously, judges cannot gauge as accurately the expertise of an official who authored a government report offered into evidence as they can evaluate a proposed expert testifying in person, where an individual voir dire would normally be conducted. Whether the author of the report has sufficient expertise to render the opinion expressed in the report is clearly an issue of admissibility to be decided by the judge, not, as some courts have ruled, an issue of credibility to be decided by the jury. See, e.g., Walker v. Fairchild Indus., 554 F. Supp. 650, 654 (D. Nev. 1982) ("the issue of qualifications of the investigators goes more to the weight and credibility of the evidence than its admissibility").
138. See supra note 13.
expertise by requiring the party opposing the admission of the report to show that the expert was not qualified to render the opinion stated in the report. 139 Although on an individual level this may be appropriate, there are whole categories of officials whose opinions should not be admissible whether provided as live testimony or in a public record.
The test here should be whether the authors of the report would have been allowed to give their opinions if they had heard all of the information that they used to form their opinions through listening to witnesses at the actual trial. Take, for example, the report of a government doctor, who after examining a party's medical records writes a report indicating an opinion that the party is permanently disabled. If the doctor had attended the trial and listened to live testimony concerning the party's condition, rather than examining the party's medical records, the doctor would be allowed to testify as to an opinion of whether the party was permanently disabled. Therefore, under this standard, assuming that the other conditions of Rule 803(8)(C) are met, the doctor's opinion given in the written report would also be admissible.
The result should be different, however, if the author of the report had not been a medical doctor, but instead a worker's compensation hearing officer, who, after conducting a hearing at which expert medical testimony was presented, had authored a report stating the conclusion that a party was permanently disabled. The report should not be admissible because a worker's compensation hearing officer would not be deemed qualified to give that opinion live at trial after having heard that same testimony while sitting through the trial. If not qualified to give an opinion live based on testimony presented at the trial, the officer's written opinion, which is less reliable because not subject to cross-examination and not based on evidence heard by the jury, should certainly not be admitted. Although the hearing examiner is an expert of sorts, this expertise is not as a medical doctor, but in worker's compensation law and fact finding. At the worker's compensation hearing, the officer must weigh the medical testimony, applying the law to those facts, and reach a conclusion. At the trial, however, this is the jury's function. 139 . The Melville court, 443 F. Supp. at 1114, accepted the proposition that the author of the report must have sufficient expertise to have rendered the opinion if called as an expert at trial, see supra note 137. The court, however, required the party opposing admission to mount a "specific challenge" to the expertise of the reporter. 142 In Alexander the Court rejected an employer's argument that a labor arbitration finding of no discrimination precluded an employee's Title VII lawsuit, holding that "the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration · clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title VII." 143 Although the arbitration decision would not bar the employee's suit, the Court indicated, without explanation, that it "may be admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate."144
This dictum in Alexander can best be explained not as an evidentiary ruling, but as part of the "accommodation" the Court was trying to reach between two federal substantive policies. The employee argued that the negative arbitration decision should have no effect on the Title VII suit, while the employer asserted that it should completely bar suit on a res judicata basis. The Court compromised by giving some, but not preclusive effect to the decision. The decision is admissible not because of any special reliability, but to give some effect to the arbitration and thereby further ''the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes . . . . ' The opinions allowing admission of EEOC administrative findings are not wrong, but they should be based on an interpretation of congressional intent concerning the Title VII process and not on Rule 803(8)(C). In deciding whether to admit the conclusions of a hearing examiner or arbitrator in similar situations, the court should proceed as follows: If the hearing officer would not have been permitted to give an opinion in person as an expert, the officer's written opinion should not be admitted under Rule 803(8)(C). In such cases, however, the court should examine the cause of action to determine whether there is either an explicit legislative directive or a strong policy reason for giving the administrative conclusions some evidentiary weight at trial.
An example of a fact finding that would be admissible under this approach is one that comes from the medical malpractice panels in several states. These findings are often determined to be admissible by the statutes creating the panels. 149 Even if the admissibility of these findings were not mandated by statute, courts should generally admit them because of the primary policy reasons behind the creation of the panels, that is, to encourage settlement and to avoid the necessity of trying medical malpractice cases.
150
Knowledge by both parties that the finding can be introduced at trial encourages settlement.
D. Source of Expert Opinion
If an investigator's opinion or conclusion is not based on personal knowledge, it should not automatically be admissible, even if the investigator would qualify as an expert. An opinion presented in an investigative report, like an expert's opinion presented live at trial, must be based on facts or data "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field. " 151 The advisory committee's note to Rule 703 explicitly states that ''The language would not warrant admitting in evidence the opinion of an 'accidentologist' as to the point of impact in an automobile collision based on statements of bystanders. ' . . enlargement of permissible data may tend to break down the rules of exclusion unduly, notice should be taken that the rule requires that the facts or data "be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." The language would not warrant admitting in evidence the opinion of an "accidentologist" as to the point of impact in an automobile collision based on statements of bystanders, since this requirement is not satisfied. The clear import of this statement is that the advisory committee believed that an expert determining the cause of a particular accident would not reasonably rely on statements of bystanders. This conclusion seems questionable. Whether it is reasonable for an expert to rely on bystander statements is a factual matter that may vary from case to case based on cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Beech Aircrajt, 154 the Sixth Circuit did virtually that by admitting a police sergeant's accident report which was based in part on the statements of one of the parties.
155 Most courts, however, have refused to admit accident reports based on hearsay statements.
156
As noted earlier, the advisory committee's note to 803(8)(C) lists as a factor to be considered the ''possible motivation problems suggested by Palmer v. Hoffman."
157 If this refers to the motivation of the witnesses whom the investigator interviewed, in addition to the motivation of the investigator himself, it is a step in the right direction.
158 An expert's opinion based extensively on the hearsay statements of interested witnesses should be excluded as untrustworthy . 159 such matters as the reliability of the witnesses, the extent of corroborating physical evidence, and other factors.
It is critical that before admitting the live expert testimony under Rule 703, the court must determine that the expert's reliance on the source of information was reasonable. The court should also determine this before admitting an opinion under Rule 803 (8) 1943) , the Court did not explicitly refer to the motivation of either the railroad company that prepared the report or the engineer whose statement it contained. The actual holding of Palmer is that the report did not satisfy the requirement of the Business Records Act, ch. 640 § I, 49 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982)) (the precursor to Rule 803(6)), that it must be prepared in the regular course of business, because its "primary utility is in litigating, not in railroading." Palmer, 318 U.S. at 114. Subsequently, most courts and commentators have agreed, however, that the Court was concerned about the motivation to lie which was present both as to the company and the engineer that made the report untrustworthy. In examining the police report for trustworthiness under Rule 803(8)(C), the Baker court looked only to the "possible motivational problems" of the police officer who prepared the report. Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 1978). To be faithful to the advisory committee's four factors and to Palmer, the court should also have examined the motives of the witness who gave the information to the officer. That witness was clearly an interested party, and his "motivational problems" should have been considered in determining whether the report's conclusion was trustworthy.
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The standard, however, should be more explicit. If the expert would not be allowed to give an opinion at trial due to its reliance on improper or insufficient data, the opinion in the report should also not be admitted. If, on the other hand, the author of the report has based conclusions on the type of information normally relied on by experts in his field, the report should not be inadmissible merely because that information contained inadmissible hearsay .
160 Some courts have gone further by intimating that no conclusions based on hearsay evidence would be considered trustworthy, and all such reports would be inadmissible.
161 As previously noted, this probably goes too far, because a reading of Rule 803(8)(C) in conjunction with 803(8){B) indicates that at least some findings based on hearsay sources would be admissible under subsection C.
162

E. Hearsay Statements Contained Within the Report
A related problem is whether the hearsay statements of witnesses upon which the investigator based conclusions may also be admitted if included in a properly admitted report. Such statements may constitute "hearsay within hearsay" and thus can only be admitted if each part conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule.
163
They are not made admissible merely because they are enshrined in a government report. 164 On the other hand, if such statements are admitted along with the investigator's findings, they are not really hearsay at all, as (court found a police accident report "derived primarily from the story of a biased eyewitness" inadmissible under Rule 803(8)(C) because of "possible motivational problems.").
160. This comports with one of the seven additional criteria developed by Judge Becker in Zenith Radio: "(7) Where the public report purports to offer expert opinion, the extent to which the facts or data upon which the opinion is based are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." Zenith Radio Corp. they are offered to show the basis for the investigator's opinion and not for the truth of the matter asserted.
·
It is again reasonable to adopt the approach taken by the Federal Rules of Evidence for dealing with the admissibility of the basis of an expert's opinion. Unfortunately, Rule 705, which addresses this problem, does not specifically state whether the proponent of an expert's opinion may automatically introduce the facts and data upon which the expert relied.
166 It does, however, give the opposing party the right to require such disclosure on cross-examination. 167 The rule also states that the expert may testify "without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data .... " 168 This, of course, leaves open whether the expert may disclose the underlying facts or data when those sources are inadmissible hearsay.
Most courts and commentators adopt the reasoning above and allow such disclosure, but merely to explain the basis of the expert's testimony . 169 It seems reasonable to treat hearsay statements contained in an investigative report in the same manner. They should 165 . See Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1007, 1013-14 (lith Cir. 1984). The court stated:
Fowler also claims that the district court erred in admitting affidavits that the EEOC collected during its field investigations. The appellant acknowledges that the actual report and findings of the commission's field. investigation are admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C), which excepts from the hearsay exclusion the results of federal investigation, but he contends that the affidavits that support those findings do not fall within 803(8)(C) and are therefore inadmissible hearsay. The contention is without merit because the district court admitted the affidavits not as evidence of the truth of statements that they contained but only for the limited purpose of showing the basis for the EEOC's findings. Consequently .. the affidavits were not hearsay. · · !66. FED. R. EVID. 705 ("The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.").
167 The Rule [703) does not indicate whether the expert can state for the jury the factual basis of an opinion if the facts are of a type generally excluded from evidence. Rule 705 is not helpful on this point either. The best reading of Rule 703 in our view is to read the word "otherwise" into the last sentence of the rule before the word "admissible." The result of this reading is that the expert can rely not only on facts· reasonably relied upon by experts in his field, but also can give a full account to the jury, which is necessary to insure that the jury has a basis for properly assessing the testimony. Evidence not otherwise admissible is not admitted under this rule for its truth; it is .admitted to explain ·the basis of the expert opinion.
[Vol. 38 be admissible, but only under the conditions set forth below.
First, the report must contain a conclusion by the investigator. It must be more than a series of transcriptions of eyewitness reports. Second, the facts and data must be of a type reasonably relied upon by an expert in the field. 170 Third, the author of the report must actually have relied on the information in reaching the conclusion.
171 Fourth, the opponent should be entitled to a limiting instruction that the statements may not be used for the truth of the matter asserted.
172 Additionally, the court should consider a Rule 403 objection to the evidence if the danger of prejudice, the likelihood that the jury will consider it as substantive evidence, outweighs its probative value, the need to show the investigator's basis for the conclusion. 173
V. ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS FOR APPLYING RULE 803(8)(C)
A. Courts Should Scrutinize the Sources of Information upon Which a Public Report Is Based
Rule 803(8)(C) differs in one significant aspect from most other hearsay exceptions, because the declarant in an 803(8)(C) situation is not a first-hand observer of the event in question. The exceptions are grounded on the premise that the circumstances help to insure the truthfulness and accuracy-reliability-of the observer or declarant, so that cross-examination is not necessary. 174 Under Rule 803(8)(C), however, the author of the report, the declarant, will often not have been a first-hand observer. The declarant will have to rely on observers and other sources of information to make a factual finding. Nothing inherent in the rule guarantees the reliability of the original observers, thus precluding the need for crossexamination. This is one reason that the rule allows exclusion if "the sources of information or other circumstances indicate [a] lack of trustworthiness."
175 Too many courts, however, fail to examine thoroughly the "sources of information," concentrating 
174.
See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 803(1). Present sense impressions require a "statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." The requirement that the statement must be contemporaneous helps to insure both accuracy, because there is no problem with memory, and truthfulness, because there is no time to make up a falsehood.
175. FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(C).
[Vol. 38 of the circumstances under which it was prepared. The jury is less likely to attach undue weight to a police officer's on-the-scene accident report than they are to the findings of a hearing officer after a full evidentiary hearing. In the latter case, the jury may be tempted to think that an expert, having heard all the evidence, probably reached the correct conclusion and might feel pressured to affirm the expert's conclusion. 191 The danger of unfair prejudice is particularly high when the facts found by the hearing officer are exactly the facts that are to be determined by the jury.
In addition to the problem of undue prejudice, several courts have also recognized that Rule 803(8)(C) reports can be excluded under Rule 403 because of "considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
192 One court held that admission of a government report would have protracted ''an already prolonged trial with an inquiry into collateral issues regarding the accuracy of the report and the methods used in its compilation. '' 193 Not only does a dispute concerning the accuracy of an official report take time, it also tends to focus the jury's attention on whether the facts were correctly found in the government report, rather than on the factual issues in the case. 194 Another potential "waste of time" is the process of sifting through long government reports to separate the admissible from inadmissible sections. 195 Rule 403 requires that the previously mentioned dangers of the evidence be balanced against its "probative value." In many cases, the probative value of a governmental report will vary with its trustworthiness: the greater the reliability, the greater the probative resulting from investigations by public officials, including the conclusions and opinions of the investigator. Because the report may be admitted without cross-examination of either the official who prepared it or by the witnesses the official may have interviewed as part of the investigation, this rule creates a great danger of presenting unfairly prejudicial evidence to the jury. Although the rule contains an escape clause denying admission where the report is not trustworthy, this has not always been carefully and consistently applied by the courts.
This Article suggests the following, which will help to insure that prejudicial evidence is not admitted under the rule. First, the rule should be read in conjunction with the expert opinion rules, treating the government reporter as an expert witness. The reporter must have the requisite expertise to render any opinions contained in the report. Also, if the reporter relied on any hearsay evidence in reaching conclusions, it must be the kind of evidence reasonably relied on by experts in that particular field. Additionally, courts should perform a more careful analysis of Rule 803(8)(C) evidence under Rule 403 to determine whether its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, particularly where police accident reports and findings of hearing examiners are issued without a full hearing at which all parties were represented and had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. These reports should generally not be admitted by the courts.
